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Abstract—Workflow management systems provide some of the
required technical means to preserve integrity, confidentiality and
availability at the control-, data- and task assignment layers of
a workflow. We currently observe a move away from predefined
strict workflow enforcement approaches towards supporting ex-
ceptions which are difficult to foresee when modelling a workflow.
One specific approach for exception handling is that of task
delegation. The delegation of a task from one principal to another,
however, has to be managed and executed in a secure way, in
this context implying the presence of a fixed set of delegation
events. In this paper, we propose first and foremost, a secure task
delegation model within a workflow. The novel part of this model
is separating the various aspects of delegation with regards to
users, tasks, events and data, portraying them in terms of a multi-
layered state machine. We then define delegation scenarios and
analyse additional requirements to support secure task delegation
over these layers. Moreover, we detail a delegation protocol with a
specific focus on the initial negotiation steps between the involved
principals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the complex day to day workflows in large
organisations are facilitated and conducted using Workflow
Management Systems (WfMS). Security is an essential and
integral part of workflows, addressing the properties of in-
tegrity, confidentiality and availability. In a workflow, integrity
prevents the unauthorised modification of information, whilst
confidentiality implies that no data or resource is accessed by
unauthorised users at anytime. Availability moreover, implies
that a resource should be available when it is needed.
Within WfMS research we observe a tendency moving
away from strict enforcement approaches towards mechanisms
supporting exceptions that make it difficult to foresee when
modelling a workflow. Along those lines one specific set
of mechanisms is task delegation that allow at workflow
execution time for the exception-based delegation of a task [1].
Consequently, the delegation of a task can be very useful for
real-world situations where a user who is authorised to perform
a task is either unavailable or too overloaded with work to
successfully complete it. This can occur, for example, when
certain subjects are sick or on leave. It is frequently the case
that delaying these task executions will violate time constraints
on the workflow impairing the entire workflow execution.
Delegation is a suitable approach to handle such exceptions
and to ensure alternative scenarios by making WfMS flexible
and efficient.
Most of the work done in the area of security constraints
and requirement modelling is focused on the infrastructure
of WfMS and secure transaction management in workflow
execution [2], [3]. There exists little related work in the
domain of specifying task-based delegation. This observation
is supported by research done by Aalst et al. [4] and Hung
et al. [2]. They outlined that existing solutions, such as the
Workflow Authorisation Model (WAM) [3], are static and do
not support sufficient security constraints from build-time to
run-time of a workflow. Moreover, model-based access control
mechanisms cannot satisfy most criteria required for a secure
task delegation model with regards to the aspects of users,
tasks, events and data [5].
In order to tackle these problems we need to address
two important issues, namely allowing the delegation task to
complete, and having a secure delegation within a workflow.
Allowing task delegation to complete requires a model that
forms the basis of what can be analysed during the delegation
protocol. Secure delegation implies the controlled propagation
of authority, ensuring confidentiality at the control and data
flow layers as well as availability at the task assignment layer
and integrity at the data layer.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we define
a secure task delegation model separating the various aspects
of delegation in terms of a multi-layered state machine, where
the interactions between the different layers are triggered by
delegation events. These delegation events imply appropriate
authorisation on the delegatee side for further actions as well
as contain required context for those actions. Second, we
expand on earlier work we have done [6] to identify real world
scenarios supporting delegation and illustrate the working
of our secure task delegation model. We finally introduce
a delegation protocol, in particular focusing on the initial
negotiation steps. We believe that negotiation had not yet been
treated in sufficient detail and accordingly, a more detailed
discussion around negotiation in the delegation protocol and
its main states and operations is a part of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section
2 proceeds with an overview of a task life cycle and extends it
to support delegation. In Section 3 we present our secure task
delegation model within a workflow analysing relationships
between users, tasks, events and data. An e-government case
study is presented in Section 4 and several delegation scenarios
are defined on basis of this case study. In Section 5 we
introduce a delegation protocol to support our model. Section 6
describes the related work and compares it to our approach. In
Section 7 we discuss and conclude our approach, and outline
several topics of potential future work.
II. TASK DELEGATION MODEL
In this section, we provide the basic definitions and ter-
minologies based on the workflow management coalition
specifications [7]. In the context of a workflow, a process is
composed of a number of activities which are connected in
the form of a directed graph. An activity describes a piece
of work that forms one logical step within a process. During
execution, an activity instance includes tasks or services which
are human implementations or computerised implementations
of an activity.
A. Task life cycle
In this paper, our main concern is the task level. A task
corresponds to a single unit of work. Each executing task is
termed a work item [4]. In an elementary form, a task is an
atomic unit of work. In a compound form, it modularises an
execution order of a set of subtasks. It can define a sub-process
or a block of tasks. In this paper, we consider the elementary
form for simplicity’s sake. The basic states for a task life cycle
are Initial, Assigned, Executed, Failed, and Completed [7].
B. Basic task delegation model
Delegation can be introduced to a task model through
an extension that supports additional states and transitions.
Delegate is closely related to the Assign transition, where the
assigned user has the authority to Execute or Delegate the
task. The Revoke transition is derived from Delegate transition,
such that it can be considered as the cancellation of the
task delegation. The internal delegation states are Executed,
Revoked and re-Assigned. The delegation behaviour remains
internal according to the task model, where Completed and
Failed are the final states (see Task Layer in Fig. 1).
III. SECURE TASK DELEGATION MODEL
Olivier et al. state that a workflow system should be
considered at three levels in terms of its components (task
assignment, control, data) [9]. Securing a workflow involves
enforcing security principles at all three levels. Hung et al.
developed a secure workflow model using a multi-layered state
machine to manage the flow of authorisations at different lay-
ers for a secure workflow execution [2]. A multi-layered state
machine can enable the analysis, simulation and validation of
the WfMS under study before proceeding to implementation.
In addition, it can serve as a powerful tool for modelling
a secure framework at a conceptual and logical level with
regards to the aspects of task, control and data [2].
We present a secure task delegation model using a multi-
layered state machine within a workflow. A workflow is rep-
resented as a partially ordered set of tasks that is coordinated
by a set of events. An event can be either a data event or
control event. For instance, control events may refer to the
task delegation transitions defined in Sect. II-B. We define
three layers: Task, Control and Data (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Multi-layered state machine for secure task delegation
The novelty of this model lies in the separation of the
various aspects of delegation, and in its portrayal as a multi-
layered architecture. The major motivations for using a multi-
layered state machine are the modelling of different aspects of
authorisations in a single framework, and the ability to address
different security services to handle the security properties
in different layers. For instance, discretionary access control
services can be applied to Task Layer and Data Layer to
handle the security property of authorisation for delegating or
revoking tasks and resources to and from users, respectively.
We impose security requirements on events to ensure the
security properties of integrity, confidentiality and availability.
During a delegation request the interactions between the differ-
ent layers are triggered by delegation events. These delegation
events imply appropriate authorisation on the delegatee side
for further actions (starting the delegated task) as well as
contain required context for those actions (accessing delegated
task resources).
In the Task Layer, we require that Assign defines availabil-
ity: ”For every task there must be at least one user (delegator)
who is able to execute (delegate) the task”. In addition, the
assignment of the task means that the user has the authority
to execute it, thereby controlling confidentiality and integrity
of the assigned task. The list of potential delegators could be
computed using the optimal user-activity assignment approach
defined in [10].
In the Control Layer, Delegate defines the authority of dele-
gating a task. We define a privilege (pr) as a role assignment
or action on a resource. We require that ”A delegatee can only
perform the delegated task if and only if the task is delegated
and delegated privilege is granted by the delegator”. The
control layer monitors the behaviour of the task delegation. It
involves the events generated from the task assignment layer
and will generate events to trigger the data layer to be executed
(see acquire (r,pr) in Fig. 1).
In the Data Layer, data are stored as resources. We define
(r,pr) as a delegated resource to the delegatee. We require that
”A delegatee can only access delegated resources if and only
if the delegated privilege is granted to access the delegated
resources”. Granting and revoking resources will ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of resources.
Note that we define additional events supporting concurrent
states. This is a practical property for a workflow model
because there may be more than one delegated task running
concurrently and also a given resources can be accessed by a
set of concurrently running tasks. In order to avoid an over-
privileged delegatee at anytime during the execution of a task,
a delegatee is asked to release the resource based on the
agreement with the delegator (see release(r,pr) in Fig. 1).
IV. DELEGATION SCENARIOS
In previous work [6] we presented delegation scenarios
inspired from case studies delivered in the European research
project R4eGov [11]. Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) is an e-
government workflow scenario involving two national authori-
ties of different European countries regarding the execution of
measures for protecting a witness in a criminal proceeding (see
Fig. 2). The scenario consists of the definition of a request for
assistance, that leads to the preparation of the legal documents
that handle the request.
The following describes a set of delegation scenarios that
outline the working of our secure delegation model from task
delegation to resource access and introduce the definition of a
delegation protocol (see Sect. V).
• Scenario 1: We consider the delegation of ”Issuing the
request of assistance” task. The delegation is local and
the delegatee is a subordinate who is able and authorised
to perform the task. The delegator would also define
the resources required by the delegatee. In this case, we
assume that the delegator knows the resources bounded
to the task thereby providing the delegated credentials
(privileges) to access resources.
• Scenario 2: We consider the delegation of ”Opening the
content of a WorkFile” task. When this task is delegated,
the delegator would find the list of his subordinates and
so potential delegatees (delegatees pool). Delegating this
task acquire the access to CMS database where resources
are needed to translate, store, and forward documents.
In this case, resources access is negotiated between the
delegation principals and a delegated privilege is issued
to grant the access. Note that the task delegation process
Fig. 2. Mutual legal assistance scenario
include additional negotiation specification. For instance,
the expected result defined as evidence where evidence
could be quantified as a numeric value or simply qualified
as a description of the delegated task [1].
• Scenario 3: We consider the delegation of ”Providing
the request of assistance” task. It is composed of several
subtasks. To ensure the integrity and availability of the
task, we define on the delegator side the list of delegatees
authorised to execute the task as well as the required
resources while keeping the privacy of the process. Note
that the task delegation process include additional nego-
tiation specification. For instance, both principals have
to agree on the accepted delegated subtasks (workload).
When this workload is defined and delegated, the dele-
gator would find the list of accepted subtasks as possible
evidence which the delegatee can perform.
In summary, scenario 1 describes the delegation of tasks
within a local organisation based on an organisational role
hierarchy. In scenario 2, evidence on completed delegated
tasks is subject to negotiation between the delegator and the
delegatee. Scenario 3 describes the delegation of subtasks
where workload specifications may depend on evidence issued
by the delegator. In the three scenarios, we define delegated
privileges to grant access to the task and its resources. The
computing of delegated privileges and the definition of mini-
mal rights as well as privacy related aspects are not discussed
in this paper. In the next section, we analyse the negotiation
as a first step within the delegation protocol and present the
different factors that may be discussed during the negotiation
such as privileges or evidence.
V. DELEGATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce a delegation protocol to support
the dialogue between a delegator and a delegatee during a
secure task delegation. The delegation protocol will support
the defined Control Layer with regards to the aspects of users,
tasks, events and resources.
A. Protocol overview
A delegation protocol describes request and response mes-
sage pairs from a delegator to a delegatee. The delegator
issues a delegation request and sends it to the delegatee (see
InitDelegReq() in Fig. 3). The first step consists of negotiating
the request based on the request specifications such as dead-
line, evidence and workload (see NegotiationReqIssue() and
NegotiationReqResponse() in Fig. 3). The delegatee will then
decide whether to perform the requested operation and will
send the response to the delegator (see InitDelegResponse() in
Fig. 3). If the request is declined, the delegator will check
whether another delegatee exists and then will renew his
request (see RedefineDelegReq() in Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Delegation protocol model (sequence diagram)
If the request is accepted, the delegatee will acquire del-
egated privileges issued by the delegator (see DPReqIssue()
and DPReqResponse() in Fig. 3). Once delegated privileges
are acquired, the delegatee starts performing the delegated
task and then sends as a response the execution outcome to
the delegator to review it based on evidence specifications
defined in the negotiation step (see DelegationResponse()
in Fig. 3). The reviewing step will lead to the acceptance
or the declination of the delegation response, and so the
re-assignment or the acceptance of the delegated execution
task (see DeclineResponse() and AcceptResponse() in Fig. 3).
Finally, the acceptance step will complete the task and revoke
the delegated privileges.
As described in the sequence diagram, we can identify three
main steps: Negotiation, Request Declination, and Request
Acceptance. The two last steps depend on the negotiation.
We consider Negotiation as the trigger point for the main
operations in the delegation protocol.
B. Negotiation
We consider the negotiation step as a fundamental step for
the delegation protocol. It involves all the principals (delegator
and delegatee) and negotiation specifications (e.g. evidence,
time). Our intention is to envisage a wide-ranging request
that gives flexibility for the delegation request. Negotiation
specifications will ensure this flexibility. In the following,
we present a taxonomy of factors that are relevant in the
delegation scenarios described in Sect. IV.
• F1. Scope: This factor describes the scope of delegation
(e.g. multistep) [12]. Basically, the delegator proposes the
degree of delegation regarding the context of delegation
(e.g. local, global).
• F2. Time: This factor defines one of the delegation
constraints: the deadline. Delegation may be actually
temporary for some security reasons. This involves a time
constraint specifying a time window for the delegatee.
This constraint utility can avoid also a long period of
inactivity of the delegatee.
• F3. Workload: The negotiation here deals with the
delegated amount of work. In fact, the delegatee may be
overwhelmed by the number of tasks assigned to him, a
situation which can be sorted by reducing the workload
(see scenario 3 in Sect. IV).
• F4. Evidence: This factor is a specific type of business
object that can be manipulated by a task. Task execution
may generate evidence for review by the delegator [1].
The negotiation here deals with the reviewing specifica-
tions issued by the delegator to validate the completion
of delegation.
• F5. Privileges: This factor can be a role assignment or
an action on a resource. Privileges will be granted to the
delegatee later on to execute tasks or access specified
resources (see Sect. V-E). Privileges can be permanent or
temporal depending on time constraints.
In the following, we identify the relationship between
delegation principals and negotiation factors (see Table I). We
assume that the five factors can be defined by the issuer of the
request, the delegator. In fact, he is the user initially assigned
to execute tasks and authorised to delegate, and so expresses
their delegation specifications. As part of the negotiation some
of the factors can be modified by the delegatee. In fact,
both principals can negotiate time, workload and evidence.
This consists of giving the delegatee the ability to extend the
deadline, reduce the workload, and propose suitable evidence,
respectively. The other factors are exclusive to the delegator
for security reasons.
TABLE I
NEGOTIATION FACTORS SPECIFIED BY DELEGATION PRINCIPALS
Factors Delegator Delegatee
F1 X
F2 X X
F3 X X
F4 X X
F5 X
C. Request Declination
The declination step occurs when the negotiation failed and
the proposed specifications are rejected. We consider this step
as a precondition to renew the delegation request.
D. Request Acceptance
Our delegation protocol supports several operations that can
be requested during acceptance request. The acceptance step
consists of granting delegated privileges, performing the task,
and reviewing it in order to complete the request. The core
operations are defined in the following:
DPReqIssue(): Creates a new privilege according to the
needs of the delegatee. The result is a delegated privilege that
delegates the negotiated access rights from the delegator to the
delegatee.
PerformTask(): Delegated privileges are associated to the
delegatee to execute the task and access resources. The dele-
gatee is authorised to perform a task and send feedback to the
delegator based on negotiated evidence.
ReviewResponse(): The reviewing operation is much more
complicated. The reviewer (the delegator) has to decide
whether to accept or decline the DelegationResponse() based
on negotiated evidence. This split decision will either lead
to the re-execution of the task, or to the acceptance of the
response and so the revocation of privileges afterwards.
E. Delegated Privileges
Delegated privileges are granted by the delegator to the
delegatee. In order to control access to the delegated task’s
resources, both authentication and authorisation are needed.
Authentication and authorisation requirements are both defined
in the delegated privileges.
A Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) is to authori-
sation what a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to authenti-
cation. Consequently there are many similar concepts shared
between PKIs and PMIs. A public key certificate (PKC) is used
for authentication and maintains a strong binding between a
user’s name and his public key, whilst an attribute certificate
(AC) is used for authorisation and maintains a strong binding
between a user’s name and one or more privilege attributes.
Therefore we consider PKC as a passport and AC as a visa.
We assume that both PKC and AC will be issued by the del-
egator to the delegatee. Certification can not be negotiated by
the delegatee since the delegator has to align his certification
request with the authorisation policy of the process in general.
Specially, certification is based on the authorisation policy of
the domain application. Domain application can be defined
as an RBAC model for specifying authorisations. RBAC has
the advantage of scalability over DAC, and can easily handle
large numbers of users [13]. For instance, we developed a
Role Based Privilege Management Infrastructure. It supports
authentication and authorisation requirements where a dele-
gator access resources via an application gateway including
authentication and authorisation functions. Our technology
mapping is inspired from the PERMIS project infrastructure
[13].
VI. RELATED WORK
The Workflow Management Coalition (WfMC) summarises
a number of security services for a conceptual workflow model
including authentication, authorisation, access control, data
integrity, security management and administration [14]. Unlike
our approach, WfMC does not consider different layers of
authorisations among tasks, control and data flow layer during
the the modelling and execution of task delegation for WfMS.
Role-based access control (RBAC) is recognised as an
efficient access control model for large organisations. Most
organisations have some business rules related to access con-
trol policy. Delegation of authority is among these rules [15].
Sandhu et al. extended the RBAC96 model by defining some
delegations rules [5]. They proposed a role-based delegation
model (RBDM). Users however may want to delegate a piece
of permission from a role [16]. Zhang et al. proposed a
flexible delegation model named Permission-based Delegation
Model (PBDM). Neither RBAC nor PBDM models however,
proposed a secure task delegation model supporting integrity,
confidentiality and availability.
The Workflow Authorisation Model (WAM) presents a
conceptual, logical and execution model that concentrates on
the enforcement of authorisation flow in task dependency
and transaction processing [3]. Though WAM discusses the
synchronisation of authorisation flow with the workflow and
specification of temporal constraints in a static approach,
it is not sufficient to support workflow security in general
and task delegation in particular. This is due to workflows
needing a more dynamic approach to synchronise the flow of
authorisations during the workflow execution. WAM does not
discuss the order of operation flow such as task delegation
within a workflow. In a workflow, we need to investigate the
delegation control in different aspects such as tasks, events
and data by leveraging the required authorisations to secure
our delegation.
Russel et al. proposed an approach supporting delegation
[4]. They described the life cycle of a work item in the form
of a state transition diagram with a particular focus on the
resource allocation perspective. One of the main drawbacks
of this approach is that it defines a static binding of all work
items associated with a task to a single resource. This is a static
approach that ignores additional events (transitions) during
delegation execution and does not support secure and dynamic
interactions within a workflow with regards to aspects of users,
tasks, events, and data. This is the major contribution of this
paper.
In this paper, we do not distinguish the delegation of
privileges based on grant or transfer [17]. Crampton et al.
developed a comprehensive delegation model for role-based
access control that provides support for both grant and trans-
fer delegation policies [17]. In addition, authors focused on
role-based models supporting role hierarchies when studying
delegation in the context of both RBAC0 model (flat roles) and
RBAC1 model (hierarchical roles) of the RBAC96 family of
models. This will be an immediate priority in our future work
to enrich the task delegation model by supporting hierarchical
delegations and enforcing authorisation mechanisms based on
delegation policies.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we presented a secure task delegation model
to manage and in parts enforce integrity, confidentiality and
availability within a workflow. The novelty of this model lies
in the separation of the various aspects of delegation, and in
its portrayal as a multi-layered state machine. The interaction
between different layers is triggered by delegation events. In
fact, delegation events ensure the appropriate authorisation of
principals to delegate or revoke a task and access resources,
thereby supporting security properties. We proposed a dele-
gation protocol based on our delegation model and discussed
negotiation factors and their impact on the protocol and later
concrete technical realisation of privileges. Our analysis is
based on real world processes from an e-government case
study.
Note that in this context, we abstracted from the eventual
technical realisation of the privileges on purpose. Privileges
could be anything, ranging from a cryptographic token in a
distributed context, to a simple additional entry in an ACL or
Capability. We believe that there is a strong dependency to the
properties of the negotiation step detailing, for example, that
the duration of a delegated task will also serve as a certificate
expiry variable. A list of such factors has been identified (Sect.
V-B). Future work will now concentrate on a classification of
our identified factors against basic authorisation technologies.
The next stage of our work also needs to address the further
formalisation of our model by supporting it through an abstract
state machine specification and verification, thus addressing
properties such as completeness, satisfiability and safety.
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